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The European Union’s response to the sovereign debt crisis, although mixed and delayed, 
has been revolutionary and unparalleled at best. In the backdrop of discussions on a broader 
role for the private sector in such crisis situations, there has been a renewed call for an 
institutional mechanism to effectuate ‘orderly debt restructurings’. In that connection, there 
have been various influential proposals calling for decisive Union action as against its silo-
blinkered ad-hoc responses. This paper is a contribution to that debate and one, which 
unflinchingly calls for an institutional framework to deal with future sovereign restructurings in 
the Europe. In this regard, the author is inspired by and at the same time, goes beyond 
previous proposals on this issue. At the outset, the paper provides the reader with a 
background to the crisis and the lessons learnt from the same. It then explores the contours 
of a ‘good bankruptcy law’ for sovereigns and examines its need and relevance. Finally, the 
author unveils his own proposal for a new European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Framework, to be envisaged under the egis of the ESM Treaty. In an attempt to produce 
more clarity, the paper suggests certain model amendments to the ESM treaty and hopes 









State bankruptcy is not a new phenomenon and nations have experienced it at different 
points in different eras.1 Despite its antiquity, structures and processes to effectively deal 
with a state bankruptcy crisis have been rather piecemeal and national centric,2 without any 
substantive regional or international rules on the subject, barring notable exceptions.3 The 
reason for this could possibly lie in the fact that sovereign insolvency is usually accompanied 
with a banking and a currency crisis,4 and therefore, a single approach to deal with multitude 
of issues is seen as rather intrusive into the affairs of a sovereign state. However, in view of 
the macroeconomic impact of sovereign insolvencies, there have been far reaching 
proposals on developing an international system of rules to efficiently deal with such 
contingencies, although, with limited success.5 In this paper, however, the author focuses on 
the debt crisis in Europe and more particularly in the euro zone. Considering the fact that 
Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘MS’) of the European Union are more intrinsically 
linked with each other, through a sovereign mechanism, it will be instructive to assess its 
processes and methods of dealing with the present crisis. Since the crisis has unfolded in 
Europe far reaching steps have been taken at the Union level to safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro and to provide support to distressed MS.6 Further the European Central 
bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘ECB’) has had a key role to play in the entire episode.7 The 
purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the present instruments that have been put in 
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place in the European Union (hereinafter refereed to as ‘EU’/‘Union’), including the much 
debated European Stability Mechanism (hereinafter referred to as ‘ESM’) facility. 8 
Deficiencies of the EU’s strategy has been explored and related suggestions on adopting a 
more robust structure over and above the ESM facility have been proposed. In this regard, a 
comprehensive examination will be undertaken to assess the limits and boundaries of EU’s 
legal competences as regards the above mentioned proposal. Further, various suggestions 
and proposals on containing Europe’s crisis will be considered. The paper, however, does 
not explore the reasons behind the crisis, although, it discuss in detail some of the important 
issues as regards debt restructuring. The author trusts that in the face of international 
indecisiveness to initiate steps towards a unified approach in dealing with state bankruptcies, 
EU can provide an early example.  
The paper is broadly divided into the following parts.  Part II, provides an aerial survey of the 
European debt crisis and elucidates the role of the Union in an attempt to resolve the same. 
Part III collects the knowledge in the existing literature on finding solutions in the form of a 
crisis resolution mechanism. It also explores some of the most influential proposals aimed at 
attracting more decisive Union action for future crisis situations. Likewise, recounting the 
problems associated with debt restructurings, the author details some of the essential 
features that one has to consider before ideating on a future bankruptcy law. Finally, the last 
Part is devoted towards the constitution of the European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Framework, as the author would like to call it, and its ensuing mechanisms. Towards the 
end, the author proposes certain model draft treaty amendments to set the stage for further 
debate and discussion.   
B. GENESIS OF THE CRISIS, EUROPEAN RESPONSE & 
ITS CHALLENGES – THE CASE OF GREECE 
It is instructive to isolate and study the case of Greece, due to fact that it was not only the 
starting point of the crisis, but still remains a focal point of the unfolding debate. As a first, 
the crisis in Europe and more particularly in Greece disheveled the idea that only emerging 
market countries were prone to such calamities. 9  It also exposed the limitations and 
weaknesses of the Union’s oversight on the budgetary and fiscal discipline in the EU, 
thereby calling into question the framework of the Economic and Monetary Union 
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(hereinafter referred to as ‘EMU’) itself.10 A direct attack was launched at the failure of the 
Growth and Stability pact, calling it “a fire code without a fire brigade.’11 The crisis started 
unfolding soon after the change of the old government and the public acknowledgment of 
Mr. George Papandreou that Greece had been misrepresenting and misreporting on its 
public debt figures for years.12 That was a huge loss of confidence for the market13 and since 
then, there was no stopping the downfall.  The problem was accentuated by the fact that the 
debt crisis was swiftly seeping into the banking sector which caused MS to immediately rush 
to save their banks.14 The UK House of Lords report on the crisis dubbed it a “syndrome of 
multiple interdependent crises” referring to a solvency, liquidity and banking crisis.15 While 
there are studies16 on the interrelationship of a banking and sovereign debt crisis, this paper 
does not address that issue.  
 
I. The Bailout Package 
Towards mid-May, 2010 the crisis reached unmanageable levels17 and contagion started 
spreading to other MS, mostly the peripheral ones.18 The difference in bond spreads only 
increased, as the markets hit the panic button on the assumption that the worsening 
situation of the indebted MS would not be contained.19 It was presumed that they would most 
certainly not receive any assistance from other MS or the Union. There was a fear that the 
Euro would break apart. However, it turned out to be quite the contrary. At the instance of 
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Greece, the Union and the Euro Area MS resolved to “take determined and coordinated 
action, if needed, to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole.”20 In pursuance 
of that, a three-year rescue package, consisting of bilateral loans of 80 billion euros along 
with an additional 30 billion euros from the IMF was agreed upon. Further the European 
Financial Stability Facility (hereinafter referred to as ‘EFSF’) and the Securities Market 
Purchase Program of the ECB were established to foster confidence in the market. 21 
Although the above measures were able to calm the markets for a short duration, the IMF 
was not very positive in its annual report on Greece.22 Soon it was realized that along with 
official sector lending, private sector involvement would be necessary, considering the fact 
that Greece will not be able to return to the debt market within the time that was originally 
envisaged. The next section highlights the key features of this second package of measures 
which was a combination of additional loan from the official sector coupled with a debt 
restructuring plan.    
II. The Debt Restructuring Plan – Its Features & Challenges 
The initial IIF financing offer consisted of a modest haircut and extra financing. A total of 179 
billion euros were to be dispersed from mid-2011 to mid-2014 along with a bond exchange 
involving an NPV loss of 21%.23 However, it was soon realized that, the offer would fall short 
of the expected results.24 In the IMF’s opinion,25 the IIF financing offer would not suffice and 
that Greece would need much more commitment from the private sector. Further, it would 
also take a longer duration for it to regain its capacity to borrow from the sovereign debt 
markets. In this backdrop, the restructuring plan was historic in all its proportions. It was 
going to create a record in terms of both, the magnitude of the debt restructured and the loss 
to creditors as a consequence.26 It called for a 53.5% waiver on the principal amount of 135 
bond series, along with the exchange of new low-coupon Greek bonds with maturities of 11 
to 30 years for the remaining 31.5%. A sweetener was added by providing two-year EFSF 
notes for the rest 15% of the NPV. Although the range has been disputed,27 the total loss to 
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investors was calculated to be around 70% and 75% of the NPV. Along with it, a financing 
proposal to the tune of 130 billion was arranged from the EU and IMF. The total debt of the 
government held by private sector was reduced to 3.1% of the total 205.5 billion euros.28  
Despite repeated warnings from the ECB,29 regarding Private Sector Involvement, the plan 
to require more participation from the private sector was taken. One of the major challenges 
that were faced in the context of the Greek debt restructuring, the holdout problem, was 
addressed through far reaching innovative mechanisms. The use of Collective Action 
Clauses (CACs) to increase creditor participation, by retroactively amending the Greek law 
was seen as a clever move in the face of impending crisis.30 The concern regarding moral 
hazard was let go of, because the deal was thought to be beneficial, individually for the other 
countries and collectively for the currency union.31 However, despite the novelties, the debt 
restructuring plan can be best described as ad-hoc and has created a lot of unwise 
precedents. Although its inevitability has been granted, the plan has called for some 
criticism. The most common of them are that the restructuring was too late, that it exposed 
the European taxpayers to immense risks and that the treatment meted out to the holdout 
creditors was unnecessarily generous.32 It is therefore instructive to see if there are lessons 
that can be drawn from the above restructuring exercise and also analyze whether there is 
an imminent need for a more permanent and institutional restructuring mechanism under EU 
law. 
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C. PROPOSAL FOR A ROBUST EUROPEAN STATE 
BANKRUPTCY MECHANISM 
The author’s proposal for an EU framework mechanism for Sovereign bankruptcies is a 
contribution to the already raging debate in this area. It seeks to go beyond existing 
proposals currently under consideration and provides for a more comprehensive approach to 
the issue of Sovereign bankruptcies in the context of the European Union. It argues that 
there is an impending need for a permanent and robust mechanism to deal with ‘orderly 
restructurings’ in Europe. In the process it also seeks to analyze various legal and political 
compulsions that may ensue in the run up to the mechanism. It highlights the specific roles 
of the Union institutions, in the discharge of their functions under the mechanism. Keeping in 
mind parallel developments in the realm of public international law on the subject, the author 
has also taken care to examine the possibility of a potential overlap and its likely solutions. 
The focus of the author is not to extrapolate an optimal restructuring plan, but to provide a 
legal framework within which a restructuring plan, as agreed between the sovereign and its 
creditors, can be operated.      
I. THE NEED AND RELEVANCE 
The debt crisis reached threatening levels, primarily because of the loss of investor 
confidence in sovereign bonds. Hurried governments on the brink of default, rushed to 
publicly declare that they will support their banks, as a definitive portion of the debts were 
held by them.33 There was no contingency plan of the EU to respond to the crisis. The 
approach till now was ex-ante surveillance and budgetary rules, which failed miserably to 
induce fiscal discipline in MS. It was thought that “…The Stability and Growth Pact would do 
the trick – just make sure that countries abide by the rules. If they do so, i.e. if they are 
always well-behaved, there is no need for an automatic insurance mechanism…”34 While 
bailouts have been in vogue to rescue failing States, the EU is legally constrained to take 
such action. The “no-bail out” clause in the treaty is an explicit bar on the Union and the MS 
to “be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments…”35 Further, even the 
ECB is prohibited from monetary financing of the budget of a MS.36 Considering the fact that 
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the euro area countries do not have monetary or exchange rate flexibility to absorb 
asymmetric shocks, it is rather imperative that a mechanism of transfer of funds exists in 
order to neutralize the asymmetry.37 Although, the ESM treaty38 has gone a long way in 
addressing this issue, it still does not address a situation where the debt level of a MS is truly 
unsustainable. Further, it leaves the question of debt restructuring unanswered. Hence the 
response at the EU level has been ad-hoc, as was seen in the case of Greece, which 
caused considerable uncertainty in the minds of the bondholders. They became increasingly 
skeptical about the willingness and ability of Greece to pay back its debts, unnerved by 
behavior of the other bondholders (holdout creditors) and indeterminate regarding the extent 
of financial assistance from other MS and the Union.39 In such circumstances, an ‘orderly 
debt restructuring’ plan through a combination of new funding and restructuring of 
outstanding debt, with strict conditions, 40  can infuse much needed credibility and 
predictability in the system. Further, it will also send out a strong message of “no bail out” to 
the MS for their incessant borrowings and to the creditors for their risky investment, thereby 
addressing the moral hazard problem.41  
II. RECOUNTING THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 
In the hindsight, evidence in emerging markets have shown that restructuring of essentially 
private debt is rather long delayed, sluggish, results in huge losses to creditors, attaches 
considerable cost to the process and finally may not be effective to return the country to 
levels of debt sustainability.42  Although there have been various proposals43 demonstrating 
the most optimal debt restructuring plan, this paper does not address this issue. The author 
considers the above problems to be rather inevitable in any process of debt restructuring 
                                               
37
 Ashoka Mody, ‘Sovereign Debt and its Restructuring Framework in the Euro Area’, Bruegel Working Paper 
No 05 (2013).  Can be accessed here.  
38
 It was authorized by Art. 136 (3) TFEU, added by European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25th march 
2011 (OJ L91, p.1).  
39
 Francois Gianviti et al, supra Note 19.  
40
 David A. Skeel, Jr. & Patric Bolton, ‘Inside the Black Box: How Should a sovereign Bankruptcy Framework be 
Structured’, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 53. p. 764 (2004).  
41
 Régis Breton, Caroline Pinto & Pierre-François Weber, ‘Banks, moral hazard, and public debts’ (Financial 
Stability Review No. 16, April 2012). Can be accessed here; Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk & Guntram B. Wolff, 
‘Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations: evidence for the German Länder’, (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies No. 7, 2007). Can be accessed here.  
42
 Markl. J. Wright, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Problems and Prospects’, Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 
2. p. 154 (2012). Can be accessed here.  
43
 Guillermo Calvo, ‘On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy’, 46 ECONOMETRICA 
1411 (1978); See generally Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, ‘Rules Rather Than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 486–87 (1977). Can be accessed here; Michael P. 
Dooley, ‘International Financial Architecture and Strategic Default: Can Output Losses Following 
International Financial Crises be Avoided?’, 53 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTERCONF. SERIES ONPUB. POL’Y361, 371–







and hence limits his analysis to two issues, which can essentially either make or break a 
possible restructuring. Collective action problems and availability of sustainable funding 
during the process of restructuring are probably the most crucial to any successful attempt at 
restructuring.  
1. Collective Action Problems 
Collective action problems (hereinafter referred to as ‘CAPs’) essentially occur at two levels. 
First, when a possible default of a country becomes rather apparent, creditors ‘rush to exit’ 
their investments or sell their bonds in anticipation of a higher return.44 This depresses the 
market for the bonds and the prices fall dramatically, which leads to further complications. 
Add to that, once a debt restructuring mechanism has been put into place, a minority group 
of creditors may try and stall the process, in anticipation of being fully paid put by the 
sovereign. Such creditors take advantage of the fact that any debt restructuring process 
requires the consent of all creditors. This is known as the ‘holdout problem’.45 This can 
severely hamper bilateral negotiations between the majority creditors and the sovereign. In 
fact, it has been observed that, willing creditors often lose their inclination for further 
negotiations due to the obstructionist methods of the holdout creditors.46 The problem is 
further compounded by the fact that courts have, in various instances, approved a holdout 
right of the creditor in question.47 Therefore, there is also a phenomenon of ‘rush to the 
courts’,48 which is experienced.  
2. Funding Problems 
It is only when a sovereign is beset with financial difficulties and is no longer able to garner 
further funding to service its debts, it resorts to debt restructuring. In such situations, there 
are invariably huge costs associated with a debt restructuring process.49 As a first, a country 
may be facing an acute banking crisis as result of its exposure to government debt. Due to 
the loss of claim to bondholders, there can be overall downsizing in consumption and 
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spending in the economy.50 Under such circumstances, creditors are wary to lend extra 
funds to the government unless they are conferred priority status.51 Therefore, it becomes 
essential to infuse fresh funds into the government at favorable rates so as not to disrupt its 
core governmental functions.52 At the same time, it is imperative to preserve the commitment 
and support of the existing creditors.  
III. ESSENTIALS OF A GOOD EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
In the preceding section we have seen the different problems that may ail the debt 
restructuring process. Therefore, it is the opinion of the author that, any good bankruptcy law 
should have certain mechanisms to respond to the above mentioned issues. The next 
section brings together some solutions.  
Any proposed bankruptcy law has to address the issues related to collective action problems 
and sustained funding during the process of debt restructuring. Although there have been 
various proposals put forth to deal with such problems like providing for acceleration clauses 
and trustee and bond holder committee clauses in debt instruments,53 the author regards the 
use of collective action clauses (hereinafter referred to as ‘CAC’), as showing the most 
definitive results. By the use of CAC, in individual financing agreements, a super majority of 
creditors can bind the minority creditors as regards the restructuring terms. 54  Once the 
minority ‘holdout’ creditors are tied to the financing terms of the bond issue, the debt 
restructuring plan can proceed unhindered. Further, CAC also ensures that final repayment 
is shared equally among all bondholders.55 Such clauses have traditionally existed under the 
English law and of lately have found their way into the New York law.56 The disadvantage 
with CAC is that they apply to only individual bond classes and do not employ aggregate 
voting across all classes of issue. Therefore, CAC bind only the creditors or bondholders 
within the same issue and do not address the problem of holdout in the other classes or 
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issues.57 In the contractual realm, within which CAC operate and considering the multitude 
and complexity of debt instruments that are issued by a sovereign, it has been suggested 
that CAC, despite their uniqueness are “an exercise in futility”.58  Therefore, it is submitted 
that collective action problems require a response, which goes far beyond the domain of 
pure contractual arrangements. In this regard, the author proposes an institutional 
framework whereby all claims can be brought under one roof and within the operation of a 
regulated restructuring process.    
A good bankruptcy law will also have to address the concerns regarding stop-gap funding 
once a debt restructuring has commenced. In this regard, it is rather imperative that a priority 
status is granted to the loans provided to the sovereign debtor at the time of the restructuring 
process. In this manner, creditors can be infused with a sense of confidence and they will be 
more willing to lend in. However, considering the mechanism already in place in the 
European Union, the issue of additional funding during the stage of restructuring is not a big 
concern. The above concerns will be addressed below.   
IV. PROPOSALS SO FAR 
Since the onset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis there have been various far-reaching 
proposals on a mechanism to effectively deal with such situations in future. They all highlight 
the immediacy and urgency of the measures in the context of a bigger contagion in the EU 
region. Some of the suggestions deal with stricter ex ante supervision of both MS and banks, 
while others specifically deal with sovereign debt restructuring of euro area members.59 The 
author believes that a brief mention of the proposals is instructive to put his own model into 
perspective. They can be divided into two distinct categories. One set of proposals urge for a 
more institutional approach and hence I have categorized them under “Proposals on an 
Institutional Mechanism”, whereas others I have categorized simply as “Other Proposals”, 
which is of course not to belittle their importance. 
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1. Proposals For An Institutional Mechanism 
 
a) Creation of a European Monetary Fund 
Although there have been many proposals on the creation of a European Monetary Fund60 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘EMF’) the most detailed and comprehensive one has been put 
forth by Prof. Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer. 61  Their central argument is to create a 
permanent body to deal with ‘orderly defaults’ as matter of last resort. The EMF, as they call 
it, would provide conditional funding on the basis of an adjustment program to MS in need. 
Further, to structure an ‘orderly default’, it envisages a debt exchange program to creditors 
with a suitable haircut. They propose to deal with the issue of moral hazard primarily through 
the financing mechanism of the EMF. The countries with excessive deficits and debt levels 
as measured by the Maastricht criteria62 would contribute a higher percentage to the fund as 
opposed to the others. By this mechanism they hope to effectively minimize “disruption 
caused by the failure of one of its Member States…”63 and respond efficiently to a crisis 
situation. 
 
b) Creation of a European Crisis Resolution Mechanism 
Prof Gianviti and others, 64  propose a statuary European Sovereign Crisis Resolution 
Mechanism (hereinafter referred to as ‘SCRM’), much like the SDRM proposal which had 
been mooted by the IMF. At the outset the proposal outlines the two pillars on which it is 
based. They identify the need for a proper procedure to coordinate and collate negotiations 
between the creditors and sovereign debtor, resulting in an enforceable agreement on a 
possible debt restructuring plan. This process would be initiated only after an assessment 
that the debt of the MS is truly unsustainable. This task of initiating and coordinating the 
debtor creditor negotiations and any resulting disputes, are to be handled by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in its mission to “ensure that the law is observed”. Further, the 
European Commission would be tasked with the assessment of determining the level of debt 
unsustainability. Finally, the then European Financial Stability Framework would take care of 
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the immediate funding needs. However, in this regard they provide a caveat that to 
undertake the above function the EFSF needs to be made permanent.65 The above they 
believe, would lay down and display a very clear resolve of the EU to effectively deal with 
crisis situations in the face of abject uncertainty.     
2. Other Proposals 
Prof. Dr. Weber in this proposal66 argues for the inclusion of a trigger clause in the bond 
agreements, which would automatically postpone the maturity of the relevant bonds for three 
years. The trigger would be initiated at the time when the ESM has agreed to extend funding 
to a distressed MS. The debtor country will have the opportunity to implement the 
macroeconomic adjustment plan within this three year time period. Weber suggests that 
there should be no change in the other terms and conditions of the bond, except as regards 
its maturity. He perceives a whole range of benefits in the nature of reduced borrowing cost 
for the troubled sovereign and better financial market stability. In the backdrop of the debate 
regarding an appropriate involvement of the private sector, Weber argues that by this 
mechanism liability would not be passed to the taxpayer and will instead remain with the 
investors.67  
Other proposals have been targeted at bond market stabilization by the use of a common 
euro area bond.68 The main advantage of using a common euro bond would be to eliminate 
speculative behavior in the euro area which would help in stabilizing the market, in relation to 
bonds. However, there has not been much headway regarding this proposal.   
D. A SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSAL FOR A FUTURE 
EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
The author in the discussions above has highlighted first, the need and relevance of an EU 
framework to deal with sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Next, the issues that are to be 
addressed in any debt restructuring process have been drawn out; wherein collective action 
problems and stop gap funding at the time of the restructuring, were marked as the most 
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crucial ones. In the light of the relevance and importance of the matter, various proposals to 
effectively deal with a future crisis situation have been considered. This part of the paper 
draws out a substantive proposal to address the need for a state bankruptcy law for the MS 
of the European Union. This is certainly not a novel proposition, but rather builds on the 
existing ones. The idea is to go beyond a mere framework on a model state bankruptcy law 
and to detail out the specifics of how the law should essentially look like. In this regard, the 
author proposes the creation of a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ESDRF’) consisting of definitive rules and regulations for an 
‘orderly restructuring’. Under this framework, a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Council (hereinafter referred to as ‘ESDRC’) will be formed to resolve the disputes between 
the parties. Although, there have been suggestions that the new crisis resolution mechanism 
should be constituted under a new treaty,69 the ESDRF as proposed by the author, requires 
an amendment to the already existing ESM treaty. The ESDRF as envisaged could 
effectively use the institutional mechanisms of the ESM in carrying out its functions. Next, 
the author explains the arrangements and mechanisms of the proposed amendments and 
also details the respective roles and responsibilities of the Union institutions. The ESDRC, its 
role, functions and limitations is examined and in this connection the author draws heavily 
from the SDRM proposal of the IMF. Finally, an attempt has been made to provide a draft 
set of treaty amendments. 
 
I. EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK  & ITS KEY 
FEATURES 
For any debt restructuring framework to produce results it needs to be based on certain core 
essential doctrines. First, it is crucial to point out that, the ESDRF will be activated only after 
an assessment of debt unsustainability has been made by the European Commission in 
liaison with the ECB.70 Taking into consideration the vast experience and expertise of the 
IMF in relation to sovereign debt restructurings, it is suggested that assessment of the debt 
sustainability of a MS is conducted in consultation with the IMF. The ESDRF and the 
ESDRC in particular will interfere only with an objective to facilitate an agreement between 
the parties. As was pointed out by Anne Krueger, debt restructuring should take place in the 
“shadow of the law".71 Considering the advantages of early debtor – creditor negotiations,72 
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the framework mandates the constitution of creditor committees with appropriate 
representation, which will induce more transparency in the restructuring process. The 
ESDRC will not substitute its own judgment for the agreement reached between the parties. 
Under the framework, claims against creditor nations or international institutions will not be 
restructured. The author believes that the London club and the Paris club would be the 
proper forum for such claims. Further, the framework contains a mechanism to place a 
moratorium on all payments due to creditors. It also addresses the need to provide stop gap 
funding to a distressed MS.     
II. CONSTITUTION OF THE ESDRC AND ITS FUNCTIONS 
The ESDRC essentially will be a dispute resolution body tasked occasionally with 
administrative functions. It shall be an independent body and would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the ESDRC proceedings and matters related thereto. It will consist of one 
person with a high level of expertise in the field of sovereign debt restructurings, from each 
of the MS of the ESM, approved by the Board of Governors of the ESM (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘BOG’). Upon the activation of the ESDRF, the Managing Director of the ESM 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘MD’) on the advice of the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘ECB’ & ‘EC’ respectively) will choose from 
amongst the persons confirmed above, to serve in the ESDRC panel. The ESDRC panel 
would adjudicate on disputes relating to the determination of the amount of claims involved, 
the aggregate voting process for the adoption of a restructuring plan and questions as 
regards the proper representation of the creditors in the creditor committees. To ensure that 
no party suffers a disadvantage, the ESDRC once constituted will adopt its own procedure 
and in this regard will be guided by the UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure. The decision of the SDRC will be final and binding on the parties.  
III. MORATORIUM ON CREDITOR PAYMENTS AND DEBTOR IMMUNITY FROM 
ENFORCEMENT 
Although, the IMF has distanced itself from suggesting an immediate moratorium on all 
creditor rights, 73 the author contends to the contrary. It is to be noted that an immediate 
moratorium on all creditor rights including the right to enforcement of the debtor’s assets will 
only aid the process of the restructuring. In this manner, the incentives for the ‘holdout’ 
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creditors will be substantially reduced and will prevent a ‘rush to the courts’. However, upon 
the commencement of the negotiations, a creditor may petition the ESDRC for lifting the stay 
on enforcement or payment of outstanding dues, on the basis that the debtor has not been 
negotiating in good faith.  
IV. CONSTITUTION OF THE CREDITOR COMMITTEE 
Early debtor-creditor coordination will enable the formulation of a quicker restructuring plan 
and would reduce the uncertainty in the markets. Therefore, it is proposed that soon after the 
sovereign debtor has made all the necessary disclosures regarding its indebtedness, the MD 
shall call for the constitution of a committee of creditors affected, with proportionate 
representation. Any dispute as regards the representative character of the committee will be 
referred to the ESDRC.  The committee along with the sovereign debtor will undertake 
negotiations so as to arrive at a restructuring plan. To address the concerns that debtors are 
usually reluctant to participate in a coordination meeting,74 a pertinent assessment of the 
good faith negotiations of the debtor will be undertaken to finally decide on the amount of the 
funds to be extended under the ESM.  
V. VOTING THRESHOLD UNDER THE ESDRF 
In the case of restructurings involving bond issues held by private parties, invariably, the 
sheer size and number of the bondholders makes the negotiation process rather 
challenging.75 Voting patterns have to reflect the concerns of a debtor, having to satisfy each 
and every bondholder, and the necessary adverse consequences of that process on debt 
restructuring. In this regard, the recent decision of the euro area MS to embrace the use of 
CAC to simplify the debt restructuring process goes a long way in addressing the hold out 
problem.76 Although there is some literature suggesting that the inclusion of CAC increase 
the borrowing costs of the sovereign debtor, there is no real evidence to establish that 
claim.77 However, as noted above, CAC suffer from the limitation that super-majority voting 
is restricted only to that class of bond issues, in which it is provided. Therefore, a 
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restructuring process may nonetheless be stalled by obstructionist bondholders in other 
classes of bond issues. To remedy this defect, it is the author’s suggestion to include 
aggregation clauses within the debt instruments whereby financial terms of more than one 
class of bonds can be modified by an aggregate voting across all debt instruments.78 The 
latest draft of the Sub-committee on Sovereign Debt Markets provides for a cross-series 
voting requirements in line with calls for aggregated voting. It provides for an aggregate 
voting percentage of not less than 75% of the total principle amount of the debt outstanding 
along with a 66% of votes in each individual bond series.79 The author is in full agreement 
with the above thresholds and suggests the inclusion of the same while voting on matter 
under the ESDRF.  
VI. APPROVAL OF THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN AND IMMEDIATE FINANCING 
Once a restructuring plan has been agreed upon, it shall be sent to the MD, BOG and the 
ESDRC for their approval. The ESDRC, upon receiving the plan will verify the application of 
voting thresholds and also determine whether to lift the moratorium or amend its terms in 
accordance with the restructuring plan. At this stage, the ESDRC will be dissolved and 
become functus officio. On approval, the Board of Governors will entrust the ECB and EC to 
draw out a plan for immediate funding, having regard to the amount necessary to support 
core governmental functions and services. 
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The debt crisis in Europe has given rise to unique problems and along with those newer 
solutions. What started in Greece, slowly spread to other MS, affecting them in varying 
ways. The whole edifice of the Economic and Monetary Union was disheveled, and 
European values and institutions were called into questions. 80  EU, as we have seen 
responded valiantly, but not decisively. Far reaching steps were initiated to preserve the 
financial stability of the Euro and of the MS for which even the treaties were pushed to their 
constitutional limits. 81  The purpose of this paper was to study the mechanisms and 
processes that were employed by the Union to deal with the present crisis. In this regard, the 
author briefly discussed the turning points of the unfolding crisis and highlighted the 
European response to the same. In order to better appreciate the call for more private sector 
involvement, the Greek debt restructuring package was studied. In the process, it was 
discovered that Europe as it stands today lacks an institutional mechanism to deal with an 
‘orderly debt restructuring’, which was one of the main reasons for the uncertainty and 
vulnerability of the markets in the backdrop of the Greek crisis. The absence of an 
institutional framework sent out mixed signals to market participants regarding the resolve of 
Europe to preserve its Union. Further, because of the lack of a formal process of debt 
restructuring, there was considerable delay in the entire process. As we have seen, the 
ESM, although a step in the right direction, is silent in the event of public debt of a MS being 
declared unsustainable. Therefore, it is the submission of the author that there is an 
imminent need for rule based institutional framework to deal with such crisis situations in 
future, in a much more systematic manner. Considering that there were similar calls from 
academics and practitioners alike, the author thought it fit to survey some of the most 
influential proposals on this issue.  
More recently, the EU has taken a rather non-binding soft law approach by issuing the Model 
Common terms of Reference in all debt instruments within the EU, which will have CAC with 
aggregating features. Although this is certainly a step up from the situation before, the paper 
has addressed the reasons as to how this is insufficient. After a thorough examination of the 
several debt structuring cases involving sovereigns, the author considers collective action 
problems and stop gap funding as core issues. Building on the above analysis, the author 
finally proposes the creation of a permanent sovereign debt restructuring mechanism under 
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EU law for the purposes of dealing with future crisis situations. The European Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Framework has been envisaged to be a part of the ESM treaty itself and 
the mechanisms have been detailed out in the paper. The author believes that this model is 
consistent with the EU legal framework and would go a long way in addressing the 
institutional gap which currently exists. In this regard, evidences from best practices around 
the world have been studied and incorporated in the proposal. As a further step towards a 
more germane debate, the author has also provided the reader with several model treaty 
amendments that may be considered.  
A connected question regarding the compatibility of the European Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Framework with existing or developing international practices needs to be 
answered. In the author’s analysis, decisive EU action in the form of an institutional 
mechanism will only augment the legitimacy and relevancy of a SDRM type approach at the 
international level. Further, a EU bankruptcy law can serve as a model for future 
developments in this field. Due to Europe’s unique constitutional position, by which MS in 
their affairs are intrinsically linked with each other, it provides a fertile ground to test the 
effectiveness of such a mechanism, with anticipatory success. The author trusts that there 
are great benefits to be had for both Europe and the world, from the implementation of an 
institutional mechanism to deal with future debt crisis.   
A final concern with respect to not only the specific proposal outlined above, but connected 
to the idea of Sovereign debt restructuring in general, is the argument of an indirect 
expropriation of property and its compatibility with Art. 1 of the Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  Although the author considers that the instant 
paper does not occasion an elaborate discussion on such claims, suffice it to say that loss of 
property in any restructuring deal is inevitable. Further, since the ESDRF is to be activated 
only under extreme circumstances, in the backdrop of debt unsustainability of a MS, the 
harm induced would be sufficiently reduced and in any event authors have suggested that in 
all likelihood, a claim for indirect expropriation would not sustain.82  
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F. PROPOSED MODEL TREATY AMEDNMENTS  
The ESM treaty will be amended so as to divide it into two parts. Part I to be titled “Financial 
Stability Support under the ESM” and would contain all the articles as presently found in the 
Treaty, except for Chapter 8 dealing with “Final Provisions”. Part II of the treaty will be titled 
“European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework” and will contain the following operative 
clauses.  
CHAPTER 8 
ACTIVATION OF THE ESDRF & ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Article 44 
Determination of Debt Unsustainability  
1. Once a MS has addressed a request for stability support in accordance with Article 
13 (1) of the Treaty and the European Commission (‘EC’) along with the European 
Central Bank (‘ECB’) has come to the conclusion that the public debt of the MS 
concerned is unsustainable, it shall forthwith submit a report to the Board of 
Governors (‘BOG’) and forward a copy 
of the same to the Managing Director 
(‘MD’).  
2. The BOG upon receiving such report 
shall either approve such assessment 
or shall send it back to the EC and 
ECB with its comments. If however, the EC along with the ECB sends a similar report 
to the BOG for the second time, the BOG shall approve it.   
3. The ESDRF shall be deemed to have been activated on the date of approval of the 
report.  
4. The activation of ESDRF shall not be considered to be a ‘credit event’ for the 
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Consequences of Activation of ESDRF 
Upon the activation of the ESDRF, and once the ESDRC has been constituted, the flowing 
consequences shall follow: 
1. An immediate and unconditional moratorium 
on all outstanding payments to the affected 
creditors , AND 
2. The assets of the Sovereign Debtor shall be 
immune from any proceedings related to or 
in connection with either attachment or 
enforcement for the non-fulfillment of its debt obligations, in the courts of the MS.   
3. A creditor may apply to the ESDRC for withdrawal of the immunity granted to the 
sovereign debtor.  
CHAPTER 9 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ESDRC, ITS POWERS & FUNCTIONS 
Article 46 
Constitution of the ESDRC 
1. Each contracting party to the present treaty shall appoint one person, with a high 
level of expertise and experience in 
Sovereign Debt Restructurings, to a 
reserve pool of arbitrators.  
2. Upon the activation of the ESDRF, the 
MD in consultation with the EC and the 
ECB shall appoint a panel of three 
arbitrators from amongst the pool of 
arbitrators as reserved under Article 46 (1).   
3. The panel of Arbitrators in determining its own rules of procedure shall be guided by 
the UNIDRIOT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.   
4. The BOG shall have powers to promulgate by-laws for the purposes of the 
constitution of the ESDRC.   
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Article 47  
Powers & Functions of the ESDRC 
1. The ESDRC shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all disputes between creditors 
inter se and between creditors and the sovereign debtor. 
2. Without prejudice to the generality of 
Article 46 (1), the ESDRC shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes 
specifically relating to the amount of the 
claims involved, the aggregate voting 
process for the adoption of a restructuring 
plan and questions as regards the proper 
representation of the creditors in the creditor committee.  
3. Notwithstanding the above provisions, questions relating to correctness or 
appropriateness of the debt sustainability analysis shall not be entertained by the 
ESDRC.   
4. The decision of the ESDRC shall be final and binding.  
CHAPTER 10 
DISCLOSURE, CREDITOR COMMITTEE & VOTING THRESHOLD 
Article 48 
Disclosure of Indebtedness 
1. Upon the activation of the ESDRF, the sovereign debtor shall be obliged to disclose 
all information with respect to its indebtedness to its all creditors. 
2. It shall place its proposal for a possible debt restructuring plan before the creditor 
committee as constituted under Article 49 for further negotiations.   
3.  
Article 49 
Constitution of Creditor Committee 
1. Upon relevant disclosures by the sovereign debtor, a committee representing the 
affected creditors shall be constituted based on proportional representation.  
2. The committee shall not comprise of more than ten representatives.  
- ESDRC will have exclusive 
jurisdiction to entertain 
debtor-creditor disputes. 







3. The committee shall, in good faith, 
undertake negotiations with the 
sovereign debtor, so as to arrive at a 
restructuring plan.  
4. Any dispute in relation to adequate 
representation of the affected creditors 
shall be referred to the ESDRC whose 
decision will be final and binding.  
5. The President of the ECB and the 
Director General, Economic and 
Financial Affairs, of the EC, or their 
respective nominees, shall have the 




1. The voting procedure as envisaged under the ESDRF shall be on an aggregated 
basis.  
2. The amendment of a single series of 
bonds shall be deemed to have been 
approved with the consent of creditors 
representing 75% of the total principle 
amount of the outstanding debt.  
3. A cross series restructuring plan, involving 
different classes and series of bonds, shall be deemed to have been approved if, 
creditors representing 75% of the total principle amount of the debt outstanding along 
with creditors representing 66% of the votes in each individual series, votes in favour 
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CONFIRMATION, IMMEDIATE FINANCING AND TERMINATION 
Article 51 
Confirmation of the Restructuring Plan 
1. Upon the approval of the 
restructuring plan, it shall be send 
forthwith to the MD, BOG, EC, ECB, IMF 
and the ESDRC for their opinion.  
2. Within 20 days from the receipt of such report, the ECB, EC and the IMF shall submit 
its opinion to the MD and BOG.  
3. Upon receipt of the report, the ESDRC shall verify the report as to its voting threshold 
and send its opinion to the MD and BOG.  
4. The MD and BOG after a careful perusal of the report and after taking into 
consideration all relevant factors shall either confirm or reject the report. The BOG 
shall forthwith send the report along with its comments to the creditor committee for 
fresh negotiations, in the event of 
rejection of the report.  
Article 52 
Immediate Financing Support  
1. On the confirmation of the report, the BOG and MD shall entrust the EC along with 
the ECB, to draw out a suitable financing plan for the debtor, taking into 
consideration the amount necessary to support essential governmental functions and 
services.  
2. The immediate financing support extended by the ESM shall enjoy priority status 
over and above all other creditor claims, except as regards any financing advanced 
by IMF. 
3. The BOG shall approve the financial assistance detailing the aspect of the support.  
Article 53 
Termination 
Upon the confirmation of the restructuring report by the MD and BOG, the ESDRC panel 
shall dissolved and become functus officio.   
- MD and the Board of 
Governors to either 
confirm or reject the 
restructuring plan, as 
approved by the creditors.  
- ESM to provide for stop 
gap funding and shall 







Overriding Effect of Part II of the ESM 
Treaty 
All debt contracts between MS and its 
creditors shall be subject to the provisions of 
Part II of the treaty, irrespective of whether they were entered into before or after the 
enactment of this part.  
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